Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law
Volume 19
Issue 3 Summer 1986

Article 6

1986

United States-Based Multinational Corporations Should be Tried in
the United States for their Extraterritorial Toxic Torts
Dianna B. Shew

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.vanderbilt.edu/vjtl
Part of the Jurisdiction Commons, and the Torts Commons

Recommended Citation
Dianna B. Shew, United States-Based Multinational Corporations Should be Tried in the United States for
their Extraterritorial Toxic Torts, 19 Vanderbilt Law Review 651 (2021)
Available at: https://scholarship.law.vanderbilt.edu/vjtl/vol19/iss3/6

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Scholarship@Vanderbilt Law. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law by an authorized editor of Scholarship@Vanderbilt Law. For
more information, please contact mark.j.williams@vanderbilt.edu.

United States-Based Multinational
Corporations Should be Tried in the
United States for their Extraterritorial
Toxic Torts
TABLE OF CONTENTS

I.

II.

III.

CAN THESE CASES BE TRIED IN THE UNITED STATES?

651
653

A.
B.

653
653

INTRODUCTION ......................................

Jurisdiction ................................
Forum Non Coveniens .......................

SHOULD

THESE

CASES

BE

TRIED IN

THE

UNITED

STATES? ...........................................

A.
B.
IV.
V.

Forum Shopping ............................
Case Load .................................

IF THESE CASES ARE TRIED IN THE UNITED STATES,
SHOULD DISCOVERY BE LIMITED? ..................
CONCLUSION ........................................
I.

661
661
665
665
670

INTRODUCTION

On December 3, 1984, a heavy cloud of methyl isocyanate (MIC) gas
blanketed the city of Bhopal, India. The gas escaped from the Union
Carbide India, Ltd. plant, a fifty-one percent-owned subsidiary of Union
Carbide Corporation,' a United States-based manufacturer of chemicals,
killing almost 2,000 people. The leak injured an additional 300,000 people, 17,000 seriously. 2 Indian citizens continue to attribute deaths to the
disaster.' Residents of Bhopal report lung and eye problems, vomiting,
boils, miscarriages, and severe anxiety, all, it is alleged, caused by the
MIC gas." Initially the world reacted to this disaster with shock. That
shock turned to confusion and cynicism, however, as lawsuits piled up

1. Bhopal, A Year Later: Union Carbide Takes a Tougher Line, Bus. WK., Nov.
25, 1985, at 96 (hereinafter Bhopal, A Year Later).
2. Id. at 97.
3. Id. at 96.

4. Id. at 96-98.
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and United States lawyers rushed to the scene. 5 Since the initial confusion, the Government of India, as representative of the injured people,
has taken control of the multitude of suits filed. Although most of the
United States suits were first consolidated in federal court in New York,'
they were subsequently dismissed to India.'
Ironically, many Bhopal residents do not know the name of the company responsible for the plant and the lethal gas leak. They refer to the
Union Carbide plant only as a factory that "belongs to America." 8 More
and more companies that "belong" to United States-based multinational
corporations (multinationals) are operating around the world. Direct investment by all multinationals is over $350 billion, with United States
companies investing close to $170 billion. ' Generally, the largest United
States multinationals are oil companies and automobile manufacturers.
In addition, several chemical companies have large interests outside the
United States.' 0
The extent of the investments, coupled with increased activity, suggests that tragedies like the MIC gas leak may be repeated. Again, the
injured parties will point the finger of blame at the foreign subsidiary of

5. Harnett, Are American Lawyers Hustling the Indian Tragedy?, 14 THE BRIEF,
Spring 1985, at 6.
6. In re Union Carbide Corp., 601 F. Supp. 1035 (J.P.M.L. 1985).
7. In re Union Carbide Corp., MDL No. 626 Misc. No. 21-38 (S.D.N.Y. May 12,
1986) (Lexis, Genfed library, Dist. file). The court used the test outlined in Gulf Oil
Corp. v. Gilbert, infra note 13, and dismissed the action on grounds offorum non conveniens. See infra notes 14-18 and accompanying text. First, the court found that India
provided an adequate alternative forum due to Union Carbide's amenability to process in
India and the perceived ability of the Indian courts to handle complex litigation. Noting
that most of the claimants, witnesses and documents were located in India, the court next
declared that private interest factors overwhelmingly favored India as a forum. Finally,
the court stated that because no United States interest existed that would justify the
administrative and financial burden of hearing the cases in the United States, and because India had a strong interest in the matter, public interest factors favored moving the
case to India. The court made the dismissal contingent upon Union Carbide submitting
to the jurisdiction of Indian courts, waiving statute of limitation defenses, and agreeing to
satisfy any judgment rendered by an Indian court so long as minimal due process requirements were met. The court further stipulated that discovery in the case was to be
governed by the United States Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
8. Bhopal, A Year Later, supra note 1, at 101.
9. 0. FREEMAN, THE MULTINATIONAL COMPANY 2 (1981).
10. A. RUGMAN, D. LECRAW & L. BOOTH, INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS 14 (1985).
The 1979 Fortune 500 study of the largest United States MNCs revealed that the top
ten MNCs based on sales were Exxon, General Motors, Mobil, Ford Motor Co., Texaco, Standard Oil of California, Gulf Oil Co., International Business Machines, General
Electric and Standard Oil of Indiana. E.I. DuPont de Nemours Co. ranked sixteenth.
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a United States multinational. This is, therefore, a pivotal time in the
field of international civil litigation. The United States Government must
make certain policy decisions. First, it must decide the extent of its interests in the industrial activity of these United States-based foreign companies. Should the United States Government recognize an interest in regulating or monitoring the foreign subsidiaries, it must then consider
whether the level of interest is sufficient to require subsequent complex
litigation to be tried in United States courts. In turn, the United States
courts must decide whether to review extraterritorial toxic tort cases or
to dismiss them to foreign courts. If the United States courts retain jurisdiction, certain domestic procedural tools used in this country must be
altered or amended to achieve fairness in this controversial, international
litigation.
II.

CAN THESE CASES BE TRIED IN THE UNITED STATES?

A. Jurisdiction
A multinational corporation based in the United States is subject to
the personal jurisdiction of the state and federal courts sitting in any
state with which the corporation has minimum contacts."' In addition,
there must be adequate notice to all relevant parties to satisfy the requirements of due process.12 Finally, all parties must meet the requirements of the appropriate federal or state jurisdictional statute. Ultimately, jurisdiction should not be controversial in these cases, unless the
United States corporation can demonstrate that the foreign corporation
responsible for the tort is a separate entity with no ties to the United
States.
B.

Forum Non Conveniens

Unfortunately for many foreign plaintiffs, adequate jurisdiction alone
does not ensure that a claim filed in a United States court will, in fact,
be tried in this country. The court could dismiss the claim to the place of
the tort or to some other appropriate forum by using the doctrine of
forum non conveniens. This doctrine allows a court to "resist imposition
on its jurisdiction even when jurisdiction is authorized by the letter of a
general statute.""3 The doctrine had no consistent pattern of use and
application in the United States court system until 1947,14 when the Su11.
12.
13.
14.

International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316-17 (1945).
Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 314-15 (1950).
Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501, 507 (1947).
Note, Forum Non Coveniens: Standardsfor the Dismissal of Actions from
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preme Court decided Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert.15 The Gilbert Court
formulated the standard for dismissal under forum non conveniens that
courts still use today.
The Gilbert Court first required that the forum non conveniens doctrine be applied with flexibility: no single factor should always be dispositive.16 The Court divided the relevant considerations into two categories: the private interests of the litigant and public interests. The private
interests include:
.. .the relative ease of access to sources of proof; availability of compulsory process for attendance of unwilling, and the cost of obtaining attendance of willing, witnesses; possibility of view of premises, if view would be
appropriate to the action; and all other practical problems that make trial
of a case easy, expeditious and inexpensive. There may also be questions
as to the enforceability of a judgment if one is obtained.
The court will
17
weigh relative advantages and obstacles to a fair trial.
These considerations must be balanced against public interests. The
Court stated:
Factors of public interest also have a place in applying the doctrine. Administrative difficulties follow for courts when litigation is piled up in congested centers instead of being handled at its origin. Jury duty is a burden
that ought not to be imposed upon the people of a community which has
no relation to the litigation. In cases which touch the affairs of many persons, there is reason for holding the trial in their view and reach rather
than in remote parts of the country where they can learn of it by report
only. There is a local interest in having localized controversies decided at
home. There is an appropriateness, too, in having the trial of a diversity
case in a forum that is at home with the state law that must govern the
United States Federal Courts to Foreign Tribunals, 5

FORDHAM INT'L

L.J. 533, 534

n.6 (1982).
15. 330 U.S. 501 (1947). The plaintiff, a resident of Virginia, brought suit in the
Southern District of New York. He claimed that the defendant, a corporation organized
under the laws of Pennsylvania and qualified to do business in both New York and
Virginia, had mishandled a delivery of gasoline in violation of a Lynchburg, Virginia
ordinance. The careless handling, the plaintiff said, caused an explosion and fire which
destroyed the plaintiff's warehouse and merchandise and damaged the plaintiff's customers' merchandise. The defendant claimed that the proper forum for the trial was Virginia, where the plaintiff and most of the witnesses resided, the defendant did business,
and the alleged tort occurred. The district court dismissed the case, viewing Virginia as
the more appropriate forum. The circuit court of appeals reversed. The Supreme Court

agreed with the district court, and reversed the circuit court of appeals. Id. at 502-03.
16. Id. at 508.
17. Id.
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case, rather than having a court in some other forum untangle problems in
conflict of laws, and in law foreign to itself."'

Since 1947, the Gilbert decision has been modified and clarified. The
Supreme Court formulated its most comprehensive post-Gilbertforum
non coveniens discussion in PiperAircraft Co. v. Reyno-1 9 In Reyno, the
Supreme Court addressed two distinct forum non conveniens issues: 1)
the effect of less favorable law in the alternative forum upon dismissal,
and 2) the weight afforded to a foreign plaintiffs choice of a United
States forum. The court dismissed the notion that less favorable law in
the alternative forum should automatically result in dismissal of a request for removal based on forum non conveniens, pointing out that previous decisions placed great importance on the flexibility of the forum
non conveniens doctrine. Allowing one factor, such as the alternative
substantive law, to take on elevated importance restricts the doctrine and
prevents adequate consideration of other factors, such as convenience.20
Moreover, the Court reasoned that a requisite conflict of laws analysis,
followed by a value judgment as to which forum's law was actually more
favorable to the plaintiff, would burden United States courts with increased delays.2 1 Since the United States consists of fifty different state
jurisdictions, a clever plaintiff could choose one with very favorable law,
making dismissal virtually impossible.22 The Court noted that, except for
the district court in Reyno, no post-Gilbert court had allowed dismissal
on forum non conveniens grounds simply because the law of the alternative forum was less favorable to the plaintiff.23 The Court qualified its
holding by acknowledging one possible result. The Court stated:

18. Id. at 508-09.
19. 454 U.S. 235 (1981). Reyno was the representative of several persons, citizens
and residents of Scotland, who were killed in the crash of a charter aircraft over Scotland. Reyno initiated a wrongful death action in California state court against the Pennsylvania airplane manufacturer and the Ohio propeller manufacturer. The aircraft was
registered in Great Britain. Companies organized in the United Kingdom owned and
operated the plane. Reyno sought recovery on the basis of strict liability (which is not
recognized under Scottish law) or negligence. The district court dismissed the case, viewing Scotland as the more appropriate forum. The court of appeals reversed stating that
the district court had abused its discretion in its application of the Gilbert analysis and
that dismissal was automatically barred when the law of the alternative forum was less
favorable. The Supreme Court reversed the court of appeals and allowed dismissal to
Scotland. Id. at 238-46.
20. Id. at 249-50.
21. Id. at 251-52.
22. Id. at 252.
23. Id. at 250.
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We do not hold that the possibility of an unfavorable change in law

should never be a relevant consideration in a forum non conveniens inquiry. Of course, if the remedy provided by the alternative forum is so
clearly inadequate or unsatisfactory that it is no remedy at all, the unfavorable change in the law may be given substantial weight; the district
court may conclude that dismissal would not be in the interests of justice."
The Supreme Court next examined the district court's use of the Gilbert analysis. Simply stated, the district court acknowledged that ordinarily there is a strong presumption in favor of the plaintiff's choice of
forum. The court held, however, that this presumption was rebuttable if
review of the private and public interest factors listed in Gilbert indicated the appropriateness of an alternative forum. Finally, the district
court stated that the presumption favoring the plaintiff's choice of forum
carries less force when the plaintiff is foreign.26 The Supreme Court
held that the district court had correctly distinguished between a citizen
or resident plaintiff and a foreign plaintiff.26 Specifically, the Court
stated, "Because the central purpose of any forum non conveniens inquiry is to ensure that the trial is convenient, a foreign plaintiff's choice
''
deserves less deference. 1
Since the Reyno decision, the courts' acceptance of the foreign plaintiff/citizen plaintiff distinction is inconsistent. In Pain v. United Technologies Corp., 8 the D.C. Circuit held that United States citizens or
residents, or persons enjoying the benefits of equal access treaties, should

24. Id. at 254.
25. Id. at 255.
26. Id.
27. Id. at 256.
28. 637 F. 2d 775 (D.C. Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1128 (1981). A helicopter owned by a Norwegian corporation crashed into the North Sea approximately 87
miles from its takeoff point in Norway. People killed in the crash included a French
citizen and domiciliary, a Norwegian citizen and resident, a British citizen and resident,
an American citizen who resided in Norway and a dual Norwegian-Canadian citizen
whose residence was in Norway. The Norwegian Civil Aviation Administration conducted an investigation of the crash. The defendant, United Technologies Corp., a Delaware corporation with its principal place of business in Hartford, Connecticut, manufactured the helicopter and were participants in the investigation. All witnesses, records and
documents from the investigation were located in Norway. The decedents' survivors
brought five wrongful death suits in federal district court. Only one of the plaintiffs was
a United States citizen. The owner-operator of the helicopter had no contacts with the
United States and, therefore, escaped the personal jurisdiction of the court. The district
court judge granted United Technologies Corp.'s forum non coveniens motion and the
court of appeals affirmed. Id. at 778-79.
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receive no preference in selecting a United States forum.2 9 The court
explained that citizenship was not dispositive in the Gilbert test, but,
rather, was one of the "convenience" factors to be considered.3 0_Based on
this interpretation of Gilbert, the Pain court outlined a forum non conveniens inquiry based on the earlier case's analysis. The D.C. Circuit
presented a four-step analysis:
1) The court must determine whether an alternative forum exists which
possesses jurisdiction over the entire case. 2) The court must consider all
relevant private interest factors, giving significant weight to plaintiff's initial choice of forum. 3) If the trial judge finds this balance of private interests to be in equipoise or near equipoise, the court must determine
whether the public interest factors tip the balance in favor of a trial in a
foreign forum. 4) If he decides that the balance favors such a foreign forum, the trial judge must finally ensure that plaintiffs can reinstate their
31
suit in the alterfiative forum without undue inconvenience or prejudice.
Since Reyno, other lower federal courts have taken a course different

from that of the Pain court. In Gates Learjet Corp. v. Jensen3 2 the

court held that when the plaintiff selects his home forum, that choice
deserves greater deference.3 s Specifically, a United States citizen enjoys a
strong presumption in favor of his choice of United States forum. In
Friendsfor All Childrenv. Lockheed Aircraft Corp.," the D.C. Circuit
held that the district court had improperly applied a strong presumption
in favor of the foreign plaintiffs' choice of forum. Because that error
might have marred the district court's entire Pain analysis, the D.C.
Circuit conducted a de novo review and denied the forum non con-

29. Id. at 795-96. "Equal access treaties" put foreign plaintiffs on equal jurisdictional footing with their United States counterparts. Examples of such treaties include:
Convention of Establishment, Nov. 25, 1959, United States-France, 11 U.S.T. 2398,
T.I.A.S. No. 4625; Treaty of Friendship, Commerce, and Consular Rights, Dec. 24,
1952, United States-Finland, art. I, 4 U.S.T. 2047, 2052, T.I.A.S. No. 2861; Treaty of
Friendship, Commerce and Navigation, Oct. 29, 1954, United States-Federal Republic of
Germany, art. VI, 7 U.S.T. 1839, 1845, T.I.A.S. No. 3593; Treaty of Friendship, Establishment and Navigation, Feb. 21, 1961, United States-Belgium, art. III, 14 U.S.T.
1284, 1288-90, T.I.A.S. No. 5432. A person affected by such a treaty should not be
considered "foreign" for purposes of Reyno. Note, Forum Non Coveniens and Foreign

Plaintiffs:Addressing the Unanswered Questions of Reyno, 6
578, 590-91 nn. 77-82.
30. 637 F.2d at 797.
31. Id. at 784-85.

32. 743 F.2d 1325 (9th Cir. 1984).
33. Id. at 1335.
34.

717 F.2d 602 (D.C. Cir. 1983).

FORDHAM INV'L

L.J. 577,
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veniens motion.
Any forum non conveniens inquiry involves a balancing of the interests of the plaintiff, the defendant, and the forum. 5 It is necessary,
therefore, to consider the effect of a defendant's request for dismissal
from his home forum on a forum non conveniens decision. In Manu
International,S.A. v. Avon Products, Inc.,3 6 the Second Circuit held
that the residence of the parties, although not dispositive, was a relevant
factor. The fact that the plaintiff chose the defendant's home forum, the
court continued, should weigh heavily against dismissal to another forum.3 7 The court explained:
It is almost a perversion of theforum non conveniens doctrine to remit a
plaintiff, in the name of expedience, to a forum in which, realistically, it
will be unable to bring suit when the defendant would not be genuinely
prejudiced by having to defend at home in the plaintiff's chosen forum."8
How does the current case law on forum non coveniens apply to a
plaintiff's ability to sue a United States multinational in a United States
court for an extraterritorial toxic tort? The first determination is the
availability of an adequate alternative forum. No alternative forum exists, for example, if the appropriate foreign court lacks jurisdiction over
the case.3 9 If the statute of limitations has run in the other forum, there
is no true alternative. 40 Further, no alternative forum exists if the foreign
forum will not allow litigation of the particular subject matter of the
case.4 1 At least one court has also held that no alternative forum exists if
the forum court will dismiss the case on the merits.' 2
Interestingly, the contingent fee system in the United States may
render alternative forums inadequate and dismissal inappropriate. In Fi-

35. Note, supra note 14, at 542.
36. 641 F.2d 62 (2d Cir. 1981). The plaintiff, a Belgian corporation sued the defendant, a New York corporation with its principal offices in New York, for fraud that
allegedly occurred in Taiwan.
37. Id. at 67.

38. Id.
39. Nai-Chao v. Boeing Co., 555 F. Supp. 9, 15 (N.D. Cal. 1982), af'd sub. nom.,
Cheng v. Boeing Co., 708 F.2d 1406 (9th Cir.), cert. denied sub. nom., Nai-Chao v.
Boeing Co., 464 U.S. 1017 (1983).
40. Petroleum Helicopters de Columbia, S.A. v. Textron, Inc., 15 Av. Cas. (CCH)
18,112, 18,113 (D.D.C. 1980).
41. Laker Airways, Ltd. v. Pan Am. World Airways, 568 F. Supp. 811, 817
(D.D.C. 1983), affid, 731 F.2d 909 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
42. Day & Zimmerman, Inc. v. Exportadora Salcedo de Elaboradoros de Cacao,
S.A., 549 F. Supp. 383, 384-85 (E.D. Pa. 1982).
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orenza v. United States Steel International, Ltd., 3 the district court
held that the plaintiff's ability to obtain United States counsel on a contingent basis was one of the chief factors in its decision to deny the defendant's forum non conveniens motion.4 4 Because the alternative forum
required a $5,000-10,000 retainer, plus costs, in advance, 4 5 its availability to the indigent plaintiff was uncertain. 46 The court found no adequate alternative and denied the motion for dismissal.
A plaintiff in a toxic tort suit could also argue that no adequate alternative forum exists because the United States has unique environmental
regulations and a negative public perception of toxic torts. 4 7 A foreign
court might not recognize the cause of action, or might dismiss the cause
on the merits. The contingent fee argument advanced in Fiorenza could
tip the balance in favor of the United States forum, especially if the
courts or public perceive the multinational as taking advantage of indigent plaintiffs who cannot afford legal recourse.
Additionally, a foreign court may be an inadequate forum because the
social or political climate adversely influences the judiciary or other crucial parties. Courts which have actually found a foreign forum to be
inadequate because of such factors have done so based upon "compelling
facts."' 48 In Canadian Overseas Ores, Ltd. v. Compania de Acero del
Paciflco, S.A., 4 for example, the court refused to remove the case to
Chile because it feared that the courts were under the influence of the
ruling junta. 50 Similarly, in Rasoulzadeh v. Associated Press,51 the court
refused to dismiss the case to Iran for fear the plaintiff would be shot by
52
Iranian mullahs if he returned to that country.
If the court decides that an adequate alternative forum is available, it
will examine the private interests of the litigant. For example, because a
United States-based multinational is the defendant, witnesses and evi43.
44.
45.

311 F. Supp. 117 (S.D.N.Y. 1969).
Id. at 120.
Id. The alternative forum proposed by the defendant was Grand Bahama Island.

Id.
46. The plaintiff had also been unable to work since his accident, allegedly caused by
the defendant. Id.
47. See McGarity, Bhopal and the Export of Hazardous Technologies, 20 TEx.
INT'L L.J. 333, 333 (1985).
48. Planbeck, The Razor's Edge: The Doctrine of Forum Non Conveniens and the
Union Carbide Methyl Isocyanate Gas Disaster at Bhopal, India, 10 N.C.J. INr'L L.
AND Com. REG. 743, 751 (1985).
49. 528 F. Supp. 1337 (S.D.N.Y. 1982).
50. Id. at 1342-43.
51. 574 F. Supp. 854 (S.D.N.Y. 1983).
52. Id. at 861.
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dence could be located in the United States. Further, because important
corporate documentation may be in English, a United States forum
would encounter no translation problem.
The court will balance these private interests against the public interest factors suggested in Gilbert. Specifically, the defendant may point to
the congested condition of the United States courts. The Ninth Circuit
has stated, however, "[tlhe real issue is not whether a dismissal will reduce a court's congestion but whether a trial may be speedier in another
court because of its less crowded docket." 5 When the case is closely connected with the forum, burdens such as jury duty may be outweighed by
benefits such as the public's first-hand view of the trial. The court
should also consider the United States' interest in regulating the foreign
activity of multinationals domiciled within its borders,M particularly
when the corporation pursues similar domestic enterprises within the
United States.
Should the public and private interests balance, the court may proceed
to the fourth step described in Pain and decide whether or not the plaintiff may bring the suit in the alternative forum without undue prejudice
or inconvenience.85 Factors such as high court costs, lack of contingent
fees, and the social and political climate of the alternative forum must be
reconsidered.
The outcome of aforum non conveniens motion will depend upon the
facts of each case. In general, if a United States citizen is injured by the
extraterritorial toxic tort of a United States multinational, he will almost
certainly be able to defeat a motion to dismiss."8 In the more difficult
situation where a foreign citizen is injured, Gilbert provides a test to
determine the appropriate forum. Even if the plaintiffs cannot effectively
argue the inadequacy of the foreign forum, the United States' interest in
applying its legal resources and in monitoring the legal activity of the
multinationals favors retaining jurisdiction within the United States.

53.

Gates Learjet Corp. v. Jensen, 743 F.2d 1325, 1337 (9th Cir. 1984).

54. Ring, American Law: The Victims' Only Hope, 14
10, 13.

THE BRIEF, Spring

1985, at

55. Pain v. United Technologies Corp., 637 F.2d 775, 785 (D.C. Cir. 1980), cert.
denied, 454 U.S. 1128 (1981).
56. Note, supra note 14, at 544-45. Specifically, the note discusses Swift & Co.
Packers v. Compania Colombiana del Caribe, S.A., 339 U.S. 684 (1950), in which the
Supreme Court supported the proposition that a United States citizen should be able to
seek justice in his home courts.
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SHOULD THESE CASES BE TRIED IN THE UNITED STATES?

A.

Forum Shopping

Although there are valid legal grounds for trying a suit in United
States courts, conflicting policy considerations may mitigate availability.
Specifically, United States courts may dismiss cases to discourage plaintiffs from forum shopping. United States courts, in general, are the most
favorable forums for a plaintiff in the world. Together the federal and
state jurisdictions provide over fifty bodies of law. If a plaintiff can
demonstrate minimum contacts between the multinational and the forum
most favorable to his case, he can bring suit in the chosen jurisdiction. In
addition, juries, which are available in the United States, are nonexistent
in civil law countries and relatively rare in the United Kingdom.57 Juries
in the United States generally place a high value on human life and
deplore suffering. The relatively high awards given for pain and suffering and punitive damages reflect this attitude.5 8 Further, United States
courts allow attorneys to collect contingent fees and do not require losing
parties to pay their opponents' attorneys' fees. These arrangements,
unique to the United States, lessen the financial disincentives inhibiting a
plaintiff. Finally, federal and state discovery rules are extensive in the
United States."
The United States forums are particularly hospitable to tort liability
actions. The liberal procedural rules (i.e., class actions and extensive discovery) favor the plaintiff over the defendant. In addition, federal and
state substantive rules, such as strict liability, facilitate proof of liability
and collection of damages.
One way to discourage forum shopping is to make the United States
forums less attractive to the plaintiff. Specifically, the courts can apply
the substantive law of the place the tort occurred, thus partially undercutting the advantages of the United States forum. 0 Two attractions of
the United States court system to plaintiffs filing personal injury suits
against United States multinationals for extraterritorial toxic torts are
the generous damages and the contingent fee system.6 ' If the federal or
state legislatures eliminated one or both of these factors by statute, fewer
foreign plaintiffs would file their claims in the United States.

57.
58.

Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno, 454 U.S. 235, at 252 n.18 (1981).
Besharov & Reuter, Tort Laws Hobble U.S. Business Abroad, Wall St. J., Oct.

28, 1985, at 22, col. 2.

59.
60.
61.

Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno, 454 U.S. at 252 n.18 (1981).
Besharov & Reuter, supra note 58, at 22, col. 5.
Id. at 22, col. 4.
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Legal and other observers have expressed dissatisfaction and even
alarm at the liberal damages awarded by United States juries. For example, juries awarded over 250 one million dollar verdicts in personal injury cases from 1970 to 1977.82 In addition, the frequency of awards is
increasing: in 1982 alone, juries again awarded 250 one million dollar
verdicts. 6 3 Legal commentators accuse juries of irresponsibility in setting
the amounts of awards.Y In practice, defendants may accept large settlements to avoid the whims of United States juries."
One suggested reform to curb escalating damage awards and to lessen
the hardship on defendants is the imposition of a maximum figure or
"Ccap" on the amount of damages a jury may award a plaintiff."6 Presently, the only real limit on damages is remittitur,6 7 a device which
8
courts have not often utilized during the 1970s and 1980s.1 A "cap"
which is set low enough to discourage forum shopping may result in
instances of unfairly small plaintiff awards. Arguably, this is a sacrifice
worth making to preserve the credibility of United States juries and to
69
prevent a deluge of disaster claims in United States courts.
Despite the arguments to limit damage awards, certain policy considerations support complete jury discretion. Specifically, a trier of fact
should determine damages because (1) the injured party is entitled to full
compensation for his injuries; (2) the party who breaches his duty is
responsible for all of the consequences that flow from his actions; (3) our
legal system places the risk of uncertainty in the amount of damages on
the tortfeasor; and (4) defendants may reduce their risk by purchasing
liability insurance.70 Together, these assumptions about the United
States legal system support the trier of fact as arbiter of the award.

62. Wallace, The Expanding Cost of Tort Litigation, 52
(1985).

VIT. SPEECHES DAY

79, 80

63. Id.
64. Cooper, Should There Be a Cap on PersonalInjury Awards?, 64

MICH. BAR.

J. 135, 137 (1985).
65. Id. at 138.
66. Id.
67. FED. R. Civ. P. 59, 28 U.S.C. App. at 628 (1983). The power of remittitur
allows a court to reduce the amount of damages which the jury awarded. This is done
only when the amount of the award is so excessive as to indicate prejudice, corruption or
other improper influence. As an alternative to remittitur, Rule 59 allows a new trial
under these circumstances. See, e.g., T.D.S. Inc. v. Shelby Mutual Insurance Co., 760
F.2d 1520, 1530 (1lth Cir. 1985).
68. See Cooper, supra note 64, at 137.

69. Id. at 137-38.
70. Schwartz, Should There Be a Cap on PersonalInjury Awards?, 64 MICH.

J. 135, 136 (1985).
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One reason for awarding damages in a personal injury action is to
restore the plaintiff to the status he enjoyed before the injury."1
"Capped" damages which do not correspond in amount to the extent of
injuries suffered 2 are inconsistent with this principle of tort law. Under
the present system, if the jury award is too high or low, the court can use
the power of remittitur to adjust the amount of the award. 7 The multimillion dollar damage award is, in fact, rare. Nearly eighty percent of
personal injury disputes involve amounts less than $50,000 and some
ninety percent of cases are resolved in settlement. 4 The damages
awarded, corrected for inflation, are not much different from damages
awarded twenty years ago.75 A "cap" on damages also threatens to violate the equal protection clause and due process clause of the United
States Constitution.7 6 A "cap" would also remove the element of mutual
uncertainty, disrupting the equal bargaining position which allows
plaintiffs and defendants to settle fairly and efficiently.7 7 Although a
"cap" on damage awards may discourage forum shopping it may unacceptably conflict with basic assumptions of our legal system.
Elimination of the contingent fee system would also make United
States forums less attractive to foreign plaintiffs. The main criticism of
this system, in which an attorney agrees to accept a percentage of the
damages awarded rather than charge a flat fee, is that by placing the
plaintiff in a "no lose" situation, it encourages people to sue in the
United States courts. Moreover, lawyers eager to win large contingent
71. Comment, Loss of Enjoyment of Life as a Separate Element of Damages, 12
PAC. L. J. 965, 965 (1985).
72. Schwartz, supra note 70, at 135.
73. Id. at 136. The court has no power to increase the amount of damages awarded
by a jury. The Supreme Court of the United States has held that action unconstitutional
as a violation of the defendant's right to the verdict of a jury. Dimick v. Schiedt, 293 U.S.
474, 479-83 (1935).
74. Schwartz, supra note 70, at 136 (citing a study by the University of Wisconsin
referred to as the Civil Litigation Research Project). Over 50% of all cases deal with
disputes involving less than $10,000. Only 12% involve claims over $50,000. Id.
75. Id.
76. See, e.g., Carson v. Maurer, 424 A.2d 825 (N.H. 1980) (a $250,000 statutory
limit on the amount of damages medical malpractice insurers would be required to pay
for pain and suffering or other noneconomic loss violated the equal protection clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment because it prevented only the most seriously injured plaintiffs from obtaining full recovery); Graley v. Satayatham, 74 Ohio Op. 2d 316, 343
N.E.2d 832 (1976) (a $200,000 statutory limit on the damages awardable in any medical
malpractice action was held to violate the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment because it unfairly favored a troubled medical profession over the injured
plaintiff).
77. Schwartz, supra note 70, at 138.
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fees may "recruit" plaintiffs, a practice which both encourages litigation
and is unethical under ABA standards. An extraterritorial toxic tort with
the accompanying large numbers of plaintiffs and high damage awards
will attract fee-motivated attorneys. The MIC gas leak in Bhopal
evinced that undesired behavior among United States lawyers.78 The
contingent fee system has one inherent advantage. Potential plaintiffs
who do not have significant financial resources can file a claim and participate in the judicial system. In order to maintain this advantage to
plaintiffs but to correct the system's flaws, the contingent fee system requires a built-in "cap" limiting attorneys' fees. Reducing the attorney's
percentage of the fee as the award increases is one method of limiting the
fee. Attorneys are, therefore, compensated for the extensive preparation
time required by a tort case, but are faced with diminishing extravagant
returns to awards. The "cap" partially discourages the filing of frivolous
suits in the United States courts.
This traditional discussion of forum shopping, focusing on the plaintiff's attempts to get a favorable verdict and a large damage award, may
not be on point when the defendant is a United States multinational
responsible for an extraterritorial toxic tort. In that instance, the plaintiff's goal may not be the largest award possible, but the only award
possible. Are the defendants trying to escape a legal system skewed
against-them, or are they running from their legitimate legal responsibility? United States-based multinationals actually consider the available
forum as one factor influencing the corporate decision to locate outside
the United States. Specifically, extensive environmental, health, and
safety regulations result in a high cost of doing business in the United
States. The multinationals "begin to 'forum shop' for countries with lax
health and environmental laws, where workers are forced by day-to-day
economic exigencies to work without risk premiums. ' 79 The justice
unique to a United States court outweighs the potential exploitation of
the system by forum shopping.
Even if the legislature limits the amount of compensatory and punitive
damages that a plaintiff may receive, the United States remains an attractive plaintiffs' forum. The United States' social policy concerns for
health and the environment result in a hospitable if not lucrative forum.
The victims of toxic torts will, therefore, file their claims in United
States courts and the multinationals will continue to seek dismissal. Considering concerns for health and the environment, nothing short of elimi78. Harnett, Are American Lawyers Hustling the Indian Tragedy?,
Spring 1985, at 6.
79. McGarity, supra note 47, at 333.
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nation of the contingent fee system or an extreme limit on damages
would significantly diminish the United States' attractiveness to plaintiffs
looking for the optimal forum.
B. Case Load
Parties who move to dismiss a case from a United States court often
agree that the overloaded dockets and accompanying delays are unacceptable. A civil case filed in a major metropolitan area may take up to five
years to get to a jury trial. Trials within a year of filing are rare.8 0
Delays in other countries, however, can be as long or longer. India, for
example, has relatively few judges and delay-vulnerable procedural law,
factors creating an inevitable backlog.8 1 A comparison of the case loads
of the alternative forums is, therefore, the more relevant inquiry.82
In addition to a lighter case load, United States courts have proven
their ability to handle mass disaster cases. Procedural tools such as the
class action, consolidated actions, and offensive collateral estoppel allow
the courts to try a large complex case efficiently in the United States.8"
Because United States courts are well-equipped to handle a disaster such
as a toxic tort and because the case load is relatively smaller than in
other countries such as India, domestic forums are optimal.

IV. IFTHESE

CASES ARE TRIED IN THE UNITED STATES, SHOULD

DISCOVERY BE LIMITED?
Discovery in the United States is very liberal compared to that allowed in other countries. A party may require that the opposing party
provide all information which "appears reasonably calculated to lead to
the discovery of admissible evidence."'" According to the Restatement of
Foreign Relations Law of the United States, a United States court can
order a person before it to produce necessary evidence, even if it is lo80. A.B.A. ACTION COMMISSION TO REDUCE COSTS AND DELAYS, ATrACKING
LITIGATION COSTS AND DELAYS (1984).

81.

In re Union Carbide Corp., 634 F. Supp. 842, 848 (S.D.N.Y. 1986). The proce-

dural law in India apparently allows for mid-hearing adjournments as well as multiple
interlocutory and final appeals. The potential for delays and resulting backlogs appears
even greater in light of the fact that India has only 10.5 judges per million population,
compared to the United States, which has 107 judges per million population. Id. at 848
n.6.

82. See supra note 53 and accompanying text.
83.

Ring, supra note 54, at 12. The author points to the relatively quick trial of such

mass disasters as the Three Mile Island accident, the Agent Orange cases, the MGM
Grand Hotel fire, and the Hyatt Skywalk disaster as proof of this point. Id. at 13.
84. 28 U.S.C. App. at 571 (1983).
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cated outside the United States. Failure to comply results in sanctions.8 5
Unfortunately, this power of the court is easily abused and is frequently
used as a tactical weapon in litigation. For example, discovery requests
can prolong litigation, resulting in an unavoidable and significant dollar
investment. In addition, attempts to block discovery requests also require
time and money.88
The potential for abuse as well as the invasive nature of United States
discovery has led many foreign countries to view the process with hostility.87 Frequently, a great disparity exists between the information that
the United States demands and the information that the other country is
willing to require the party to release. The United States is perhaps the
only nation that does not view unilateral extraterritorial discovery as a
violation of international law.88 In response to United States discovery
procedures, many countries have enacted "blocking statutes" which prohibit "the disclosure, copying, inspection or removal of documents located
in the territory of the enacting state in compliance with orders of foreign
authorities."89 Although the statutes vary with respect to which documents are covered, which officials may invoke them and when they apply, all blocking statutes involve penal sanctions.9 0 Many of these statutes were enacted for the specific purpose of countering investigations or
litigation arising in the United States.9 1

85.

STATES

RESTATEMENT (REVISED)

OF FOREIGN RELATIONS

LAW OF THE UNITED

§ 420(l)(a) & (b) (Tent. Draft No. 3, 1982) (hereainfter

RESTATEMENT).

If the

person makes a good faith effort to secure the evidence, but the state where the evidence
is located views disclosure as illegal, sanctions may not be imposed, although the court
may make findings of fact adverse to that party. Id., § 420(2).
86. Wallace, supra note 62, at 80.
87. RESTATEMENT, supra note 85, § 420, reporter's note 1, at 18.
88. Rosenthal & Yale-Loehr, Two Cheersfor the ALl Restatement's Provisions on
Foreign Discovery, 16 N.Y.U.J. INT'L L. POL. 1075, 1075 (1984).

89.
90.
91.

supra note 85, § 420, reporter's note 3, at 20-21.
Id. This source also discusses several specific blocking statutes.
RESTATEMENT,

Id. at 22. One such statute is the Business Records Protection Act, 1947, ONT.
56 (1980), passed in response to an order that Canadian newsprint companies doing business in New York produce documents for a United States court. Litigation involving Westinghouse uranium contracts motivated Canada to enact the Atomic
Energy Control Act, 1970, CAN. REV. STAT. ch. A-19, and the Uranium Information
Security Regulations, STAT. 0. & REGs. 76-644 (1976), which prohibit any party from
producing documents describing uranium marketing activities from 1972 through 1975.
This body of law also prohibits oral testimony which would reveal the contents of such
documents. Yet another example was the widespread response to a United States court
order requiring foreign oil companies to produce certain documents. The governments of
France, the United Kingdom, the Netherlands and Italy issued counter-orders forbidding
the export of these documents. The furor died down when the court vacated the subpoeREV. STAT. ch.
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Currently, United States courts tend to limit discovery in transnational
litigation.92 The Restatement "imposes conditions of self-restraint on
U.S. foreign discovery, whether or not a foreign law might apply to
block it."" Toward this end, the Restatement places two important limitations on the ability of a United States court to compel evidence from
abroad. First, a court, not a government agency or private party, must
issue the order to compel discovery. Second, the test of relevancy and
necessity is more strict than it would be if the evidence Were located in
the United States." The requirement of a court order for foreign discovery controls the scope of a request for documents and ensures that the
standard of "reasonableness" will be applied to the request. 95 The Restatement identifies certain elements of reasonableness including
the importance to the investigation or litigation of the documents or other
information requested; the degree of specificity of the request; in which of
the states involved the documents or information originated; the extent to
which compliance with the request would undermine important interests
of the state where the information is located; and the possibility of alternative means of securing the information. '
Should the court issue an order compelling discovery, the party receiving
the order must either produce the information or face the possibility of
court-imposed sanctions.9 7 Sanctions could involve dismissal of a claim or
defense, or a finding of relevant facts adverse to the non-producing party.
Although certain courts have threatened to do so, none have fined or
imprisoned a foreign national for failure to comply with a court-ordered
nas, but the Netherlands chose to prevent future similar incidents by enacting the Economic Competition Act of June 28, 1956, as amended by Act of Nov. 14, 1958, Art. 39
prohibiting any act of compliance with a foreign court if that act affected economic competition. See INTERNATIONAL LAW ASSOCIATION, REPORT OF THE FIFTY-FIRST CONFERENCE HELD AT TOKYO 565 (1965); Note, Foreign NondisclosureLaws and Domestic Discovery Orders in Antitrust Litigation, 88 YALE L.J. 612, 613 n.5 (1979).
92. von Mehren, Transnational Litigation in American Courts: An Overview of
Problems and Issues, 3 DIcK. J. INT'L L. 43, 50 (1984).
93. Rosenthal, supra note 88, at 1087 (discussing § 420(1) of the RESTATEMENT,
supra note 85).
94. RESTATEMENT, supra note 85, § 420, comment a, at 14-15. The evidence may
actually be limited to that which is necessary to the case and directly relevant. Generally,
then, evidence properly produced under this procedure will be admissible. Id.
95. Id., § 420, reporter's note 2, at 20. The "United States position" that those who
bring themselves within the jurisdiction of the United States, whether by doing business
or otherwise, must experience the burden as well as the benefits of United States, is

tempered with this concept of reasonableness. Id., § 420, reporter's note 1, at 19.
96.

Id., § 420(1)(c).

97.

Id., § 420(1)(b).
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discovery. 8
The Restatement also describes the proper process for compelling discovery when the relevant foreign country enacts blocking laws. 99 The
Restatement specifies that the party ordered to produce the information
must make a "good faith effort" to have the blocking statute waived or
avoid application of the law in some other way."' In the absence of a
good faith effort to secure the information, the court may impose the
sanctions of contempt, dismissal, or default.10 1 The Restatement provides, however, that even if a party makes a good faith effort to cooperate with the court, the court may make findings of fact adverse to the
party if the party's efforts were unsuccessful.1 0 2 Although the Restatement does impose certain boundaries on discovery, it retains the underlying presumption that foreign blocking statutes are bad because they hinder United States-style discovery.103
The United States has also ratified the Hague Convention on the
Taking of Evidence Abroad in Civil or Commercial Matters (Hague
Convention)10 4 which, although relatively untested, is enjoying increased
use as authority for compelling the production of evidence from
abroad.105 The treaty, in short, provides:
In civil or commercial matters a judicial authority of a Contracting
State may, in accordance with the provisions of the law of that State, request the competent authority of another Contracting State, by means of a
Letter of Request, to obtain evidence, or to perform some other judicial
act.
A Letter shall not be used to obtain evidence which is not intended for
use in judicial proceedings, commenced or contemplated. 10 6

98. Id., § 420, reporter's note 7, at 26.
99. Id., § 420(2).
100. Id., § 420(2)(a). Neither the Restatement nor relevant case law defines "good
faith effort." Rosenthal, supra note 88, at 1094-97.
101. RESTATEMENT, supra note 85, § 420(2)(b). But see supra note 95 and accompanying text.
102. RESTATEMENT, supra note 85, § 420(2)(c); see supra note 95 and accompanying text.
103. Rosenthal & Yale-Loehr, supra note 88, at 1099.
104. Hague Convention on the Taking of Evidence Abroad in Civil or Commercial
Matters, March 18, 1970, 23 U.S.T. 2555, T.I.A.S. No. 7444 [hereinafter Hague Convention]. As of 1986, the treaty had been signed by 17 states. Treaties Affairs Staff,
Office of the Legal Advisor, U.S. Dept. of State, Pub. No. 9433, Treaties in Force
(1986).
105. von Mehren, supra note 92, at 54-55.
106. Hague Convention, supra note 104, art. 1.
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The Hague Convention states that the judicial authority issuing a Letter
of Request may apply its domestic law to determine the applicable methods and procedures. If the requesting authority asks that a special
method or procedure be used, the executing authority is compelled to
comply unless the method is illegal, impractical or procedurally impossible in the executing country. 107 For example, the relevant executing official may refuse to execute a Letter of Request if the State considers its
sovereignty threatened, or if the execution does not fall within the function of the judiciary of that State.' 0 8 In addition, the specific person requested to give evidence may refuse to do so if the information is considered privileged in the State of origin, the State of execution, or any other
State specified by the executing state.1 0 9
One provision of the Hague Convention could severely limit transnational discovery in United States litigation. Article 23 provides: "A Contracting State may at the time of signature, ratification or accession, declare that it will not execute Letters of Request issued for the purpose of
obtaining pre-trial discovery of documents as known in Common Law
countries."'' 10
The discovery of evidence outside the United States needs to be limited, if only to conform to the norms of international law which prescribe
the scope of inquiries and requests for documents. Even when the discovery process is not abused per se, other nations often consider United
States procedure a "fishing expedition.""' Blocking statutes, however,
are not a suitable remedy. Although they limit the extent of discovery
conducted abroad, they could leave a foreign national doing business in
the United States unable to defend himself in a United States court. 1 2
The Hague Convention is good in theory but perhaps goes too far in
permitting a nation to refuse to require its national to produce evidence
and otherwise participate in pre-trial discovery. The Restatement's position seems to be the best solution. It allows discovery abroad but limits it
to evidence actually needed for the trial."'

107. Id., art. 9.
108. Id., art. 12. The State of execution may not refuse to execute solely because it
claims exclusive jurisdiction over the subject matter of the case or does not recognize the
cause of action. Id.
109. Id., art. 11.
110. Id., art. 23.
111. RESTATEMENT, supra note 85, § 420, reporter's note 1, at 19.
112. von Mehren, supra note 92, at 49-50.
113. See id. at 50-51.
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CONCLUSION

When a foreign plaintiff sues a United States-based multinational for
damages resulting from an extraterritorial toxic tort, the case should be
tried in United States courts. The courts are assured of personal jurisdiction as long as there are sufficient contacts between the foreign subsidiary and the United States. Dismissal on grounds of forum non conveniens is not desirable because the United States has a vested interest in
monitoring and even influencing the behavior of multinationals that do
business within its borders. The requisite "adequate alternative forum"
-is simply not available in some countries. In addition, despite their case
backload, United States courts are relatively unfettered when compared
with foreign courts. The availability of juries, the existence of efficient
procedures and the contingent fee system make the United States a natural forum for large-scale litigation by non-corporate plaintiffs. Allowing
plaintiffs to litigate these cases in United States courts will encourage
forum shopping unless attorneys' fees are limited, damages are
"capped," or both. Since limiting damages puts the plaintiff in an inferior bargaining position and may deprive him of adequate compensation
for his injuries, limiting attorneys' fees is a better way to discourage forum shopping. Finally, one United States procedure that will have to be
modified to accommodate trials of extraterritorial toxic torts is discovery.
In the interests of fairness and international goodwill, our liberal discovery rules must be tightened.
Dianna Baker Shew

